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00:00:07

Gino Pasi: Today is Wednesday, December 5, 2007. We are talking this morning
with Dr. Richard Thomas who is currently the President of StraTech Incorporated
and who for many years was the Director of the Center for Strategic Technology
at Texas A&M University. This interview is being conducted in the studios of the
Center for Teaching and Leaming at Wright State University as part of the Cold
War Aerospace Technology History Project. The interviewer is Gino Pasi and as I
said our interviewee today is Dr. Richard Thomas. Dr. Thomas, thank you for
taking some time to be with us today.

00:00:43

Dr. Richard Thomas: My pleasure Gino.

00:00:47

Pasi: To begin could you please provide a brief synopsis on your university
education and what prompted you to move into the field of aerospace engineering.

00:01:03

Thomas: Yes. Actually I guess that part of the story began when I was five years
old and had a childhood disease, measles or chicken pox. And back in those days
all the doc could say to my mother was "keep him quiet." Well one of the things
she did to keep me quiet was to buy me a solid balsa model airplane of a Fokker
D-8 and that's as I say when I was five years old. I made that model and I've
been in love with airplanes ever since; they have been a major part of my life. Oh
there was a brief period when I got out of the service in 1945-this of course was
right after the nuclear weapons had been dropped on Japan-and so for a brief
time I thought I wanted to be a nuclear physicist. So when I entered Ohio State in
January of 1946, I was listed as a physics major and that lasted a couple of years.
Then I decided I was better suited to engineering and went back to my first love
and my eternal love which has been aerospace engineering.
And then at that time- my life has followed two paths, both of which connected .
with aerospace, both of which are connected with Wright-Patterson. When I
2
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received my bachelor's degree, through an odd set of circumstances I went to
work for the Air Technical Intelligence Center here at Wright-Patterson. That
was the forerunner ofNASIC-what is now NASIC-the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center. And so I got into the intelligence business at that point. And
once you are in that community Gino you're there. I mean once you're accepted
as part of it, unless you forcibly extract yourself why you're there forever. And
so it was with me. Even though I went back to Ohio State and got my Ph.D. in
aeronautical and astronautical engineering as they called it then. And so I pursued
the usual academic career ofteaching, research and engineering administration,
but at the same time I was doing "spook" work, so to speak, working for FTD,
which is again a subsequent organization of ATIC, and as I say the forerunner to
NASIC. So it's been a kind of a dual path, sort of mutually interacting and
interesting in both areas.
00:03:59

Pasi: After you graduated with your degree from OSU, you said you went to
work for ATIC, for the Foreign Technology Division. What projects specifically
were you working on at the time Dick, or were there several projects that you
were involved in?

00:04:17

Thomas: Well I had-I was assigned to what they called then "the guided missile
group" at A TIC. This was in 1951. And at that point we were just getting our
first good information on what the Soviets were doing in terms of exploiting
German rocket technology. Of course we got here in the United States most of
the top echelons, Domberger, Von Braun, and others from the German program
that came to work here in the U.S; the Soviets got the mid-level people along with
a bunch of parts and so forth and they had taken them to the Soviet Union in the
late forties and extracted whatever they could from them in terms of information
relating to what the V-2 program was doing at war's end and so forth. They were
in fact in the process of redesigning that and upgrading it.
And the Soviets had started work on a larger rocket engine which was five times
the size of the V-2 engine and the Germans knew about that. Well in 1951 the
Soviets repatriated those German engineers and brought them back to East
Germany. Some ofthem--of course the Berlin Wall was not up then and so they
came-many of them-came into West Germany where our counter-intelligence
people made contact with them and interrogated them about what the Soviets
were up to.
So from that we learned about the large rocket engine. So my main project while
I worked at ATIC was basically to design a missile around that new engine, or
around groups of that new engine, and that's a very key point incidentally. And
that led me to a report in 1952 which correctly predicted the emergence of Soviet
ICBMs in 1957; I did not predict Sputnik, but I did predict the emergence of the
Soviet ICBM force which was a major event because the Air Force, the U.S. Air
Force at that point, was convinced that the Soviets were going to build large,
long-range bombers like we were doing and that turned out not to be the case.
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And it wasn't until Sputnik and subsequently the Cuban Missile Crisis, that we
became more or less convinced that in fact they were not going the "big bomber"
route.
00:07:14

Pasi: That the !CB.Ms would take care of what the long-range bombers could do.

00:07:17

Thomas: That's right. That gave them the ability to attack the United States.
And as I say the Air Force at that point was controlled by people like LeMay and
Hoyt Vandenberg and folks that believed strongly that large inter-continental
bombers were the way to go. And it was difficult for them to believe that rocket
technology would progress to the point that it could present a serious threat to the
United States.

00:07:52

Pasi: So when the Soviets launched Sputnik was that a "wake-up call" for LeMay
and some of the other "higher ups" in the Air Force.

00:07:59

Thomas: Oh yes, yes of course it was. It was a watershed event because as
before we had kind of "poo-pooed" Soviet technology with sufficient reason; they
had then and Russia today still has problems with advanced technologies and
especially manufacturing. So the fact that they could orbit a satellite was a major,
major, event.

00:08:39

Pasi: When you were working with the V-2 technology at Wright-Patterson
would that have been part of Project Paperclip essentially, or had that sort of long
passed at that point.

00:08:52

Thomas: Well Paperclip of course was an effort to assess where the Germans
were in aerospace technology, aeronautical technology, pretty much across the
board, aircraft, jet engines, as well as rocket engines and missiles, and that was
indirectly the way I got involved in the intelligence business because a couple of
my professors at Ohio State were involved win that effort. Paperclip also
involved making contact with von Braun and Hans von Ohain who was the jet
engine pioneer and so forth, and of course many of those folks came to work here
at Wright-Patterson. The missile folks were assigned to the Army and eventually
ended up at Huntsville, Alabama, while they were strung around a little bit. Some
of them went- Damberger for example went to work for Bell Aircraft. So yes,
Paperclip had some significant effects, but what I was doing, in terms of the large
rocket engine was beyond Paperclip. Paperclip had pretty much ended at that
point.

00:10:10

Pasi: I see. And were you at that point-because this was through ATIC-were
you daily coming into contact with Soviet documents, photographs, Soviet
intelligence, or our intelligence on Soviet technologies?

00: 10:31

Thomas: Yes as I said the major source of information we were getting at that
point was due to the interrogations of the returning German engineers and that
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continued on. Of course I left ATIC and went back to graduate school in late '52
early '53. I'm sure that information continued to guide ATIC in its work
00: 11:06

Pasi: And you said once you're in the intelligence community, it's hard to
disconnect yourself from that community. Is that because of a kind of a love affair
that develops with that type of work?

00:11:22

Thomas: Yes it is that. Well that's a good question. Yes, intelligence work Gino, I
think, brings a kind of an affinity among the practitioners. And it is in many ways
kind of a clannish community. And that community will occasionally draw
together to protect itself. And so it is a situation where once your bone fides have
been established in that community, why as I say unless you just shun it
completely and withdrawal from it, why you continue to be part of that
community. And that was the case with me. Although I continued to do work for
the community while I was in graduate school and in my early academic career; I
didn't get back into it until the mid seventies, I guess when I got back into it
through the center that was established at Texas A&M.

00: 12:50

Pasi: So, it was something that you had always wanted to keep your foot in, or
eventually come back to then, this type of work?

00:12:59

Thomas: Yes, it's fascinating, intriguing work, you know to try to figure out what
your enemy is up to, especially technologically. And of course the Soviet Union
offered a number of challenges, because as I've said, on one hand they seemed to
be backward technologically. On the other hand they seemed to be advanced. It is
of course difficult-considering the fact that the Soviet Union had ICBMs, had
advanced jet fighters and a few long range bombers, and so forth-it's a bit
difficult to talk of them in terms of being technologically backward. But when
you look at it all that technology that they had was borrowed technology, or stolen
technology. So they were very good at using that, but curiously they did not have
the ability to translate that into economic progress, into better lives for its citizens,
and to better civilian products. It is a dichotomous situation and continues to be I
would say.

00:14:16

Pasi: Well, you mentioned that difficulty with the Soviet Union, now Russia
obviously, to translate ideas into useful systems. And I know we're kind of
jumping ahead a bit, but I know in the early nineties, you went to Moscow and
talked with some of the leaders of the Academy of the Sciences of the USSR. And
in one of the reports you wrote on that trip you said "there are bureaucratic
obstacles to advancement, especially in manufacturing." And one of the
gentlemen you spoke with, Kostrov, suggested that industry was impervious to
change. Is that where-obviously the Soviets were intelligent people, but- they
could not or did not have the same capacity to develop technology the same way
we did in this country. Why do you think that was an issue for them?
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Thomas: Well Gino that's still a subject of study actually and research and I'm
still doing some work on that. The science and technology system the U.S.
developed in the wake of industrial revolution in particular-in the wake of our
establishment of the land grant schools, which was a major, major advance in
developing our technological superiority-that system which the U.S. uses and
which all other advanced nations use in some form or fashion consists of first of
all research. And then out of that of course, research advances are made and those
advances must be matured. And so technology development is the second phase.
Those advances have to be reliable, repeatable, well understood so that a
designer-and designer is the third phase-a designer can integrate them into a
product whether it's a refrigerator or whether it's an ICBM, and then beyond that
that designer has to work with the manufacturing people to produce something
that can be made efficiently and at low cost or minimum cost and so forth. And
so our system as it evolved was pretty well integrated even though there were
different actors in different phases of that system. In the Soviet arena, they
seemed to have organizational barriers between each one of those elements of that
system.
They did some pretty good research, some of their people have won Nobel Prizes
for their research, but the follow on elements of that system were dysfunctional in
the Soviet Union and there are many factors that fit in to that. Not least of which
was the failure to develop a substantial professional engineering community.
They turned out a lot of people that were called engineers, but when you look at
the education they had; it was very limited; it was very theoretical and didn't
involve a lot of design work, and then there's element of creativity that enters.
U.S. people are very creative folks, especially in research and in design. While the
Soviets exhibit creativity and the Russians exhibit creativity especially in the arts
and in music, and dance and so forth, and in some areas of science, that doesn't
seem to feed into the design area and that's the critical thing. Because today in
Russia that country still is unable to design and manufacture with high quality and
in mass a product, whether it's a microwave oven or whatever, that can compete
in the world marketplace.
Now in studying that, I recently came across a paper that was written by a
gentleman by the name of Edmond Stillman back in 1980 as a matter of fact. And
in his paper-this was published in the National Review and it was a two-part
paper, and just keep in mind this was in 1980 at the height of the Cold War. The
title of the paper was "Soviet Technology is a Paper Tiger" and there was a "no"
segment written by another guy, and then there was the "yes" segment written by
Stillman. In this paper, he offers the notion that the Russian culture rejects
technology and that in fact their technological backwardness which extends clear
back beyond the Soviet Revolution back in the czarist days, is based on-and I
must say he has a persuasive argument, he wrote a book published in 1959 called
Bitter Harvest, which he was the editor of that book and it contains the writings,
he subtitles it The Revolt ofthe Intelligentsia and in that he assembles a group of
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articles by Soviet intellectuals which buttress his belief in this technological
rejection, cultural rejection of technology.
Now why that is-what is it about the culture, I don't know? That's still the
subject of some concern. You would have to ask a question about mechanical
aptitudes and things like that, and a willingness to accept new technologies and to
work with technologies that the Russian people seemed to be-at least the lower
echelons were- extremely reluctant to make use of advanced technologies. So
the technological backwardness is a very complex issue and one that we still don't
understand, and one that is vital I think Gino and that of course is one of the
reasons why I'm pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you because I
believe there are so many questions, so many issues about the Soviet Union that if
we can understand them properly there are lessons to be learned there. That's the
reason why the Wright State archive and its connection with Wright- Patterson is
so important, because there are factors there that can play into the current strategic
mix, our current problems with China. We can see some elements of
technological backwardness in China, with regard to the war on terror-I was for
a time, a visiting professor to the American University in Cairo where I began to
learn a little about the Arab culture. I learned their mechanical aptitudes are not
high; so there are things we can learn from our study of Russia and the Soviet
Union that can play into other strategic matters that confront us today.
00:22:55

Pasi: Does, and we might touch on this a little later, but we do tend to have a kind
of western-centric viewpoint whether we want to or not, we extend that. We tend
to think everyone thinks like we do; we don't take into consideration that other
cultures are very different, not just a little different, but at times extremely
different than our own and do things completely antithetical to the way we would
do them.

00:22:24

Thomas: There's a point to be followed up there Gino. As an engineer I would see
evidence that Soviets were doing things that, being technologically very odd, I
could not understand that. Yes, there was the tendency that Americans have that
we are the smartest guys in the world, therefore everybody' s going to do what we
do and it took me a long time in my Soviet studies to get to the point where I
could understand that in fact the Soviets thought differently than we do. Now part
of that of course is the Communist ideology, the Marxist ideology and indeed that
logic comes from Hegel. Our logic comes from Aristotle. It is- Aristotelian logic
is what I call "linear logic." Hegelian logic among its various tenets is the belief
that for every thesis there is an antithesis and the only way that one makes
intellectual progress in that system is to bring these points and counterpoints into
direct conflict. We don't believe that.

00:24:54

Pasi: And then synthesize them, right, the thesis and the antithesis?

00:24:59

Thomas: Yes, that's the way they reason. In fact they don't think like we do. And
we still have of course in Russia millions of people that were educated in the
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Marxist ideology, in the Hegelian logic, so that affects them. So one of the things
that I had to learn in my Soviet studies was don't be surprised at what you see
there. And of course in the early eighties I became affiliated with professor John
Erickson of the University of Edinburgh who was responsible for my getting
involved in the discussions in Moscow that you mentioned earlier. They
alternated between Edinburgh and Moscow.
00:25:52

Pasi: That was the Edinburgh Conversations?

00:25:54

Thomas: Yes, the Edinburgh Conversations. And John from day one was
preaching "think Soviet; think Soviet; think Soviet." And over a period of time I
began to understand it; in fact one had to do that. I tried on occasions to push the
clear button on my brain and think like Hegel would have me think; I couldn't do
it. Try as I might old Aristotle was back there pulling my chains and I was never
able to rid myself of that, and so the only recourse then as I say is to develop kind
of an open mind and just not be surprised at the things you see the Soviets doing
that don't make sense to you.

00:26:51

Pasi: It would seem counterintuitive to how things should be?

00:26:55

Thomas: Right. But how the Hegelian affects their engineering design for
example, I don't know. All I can say is it causes them to think differently, to
weigh things differently. It causes them to adopt a different value system and so
forth. But in terms ofbeing able to replicate that, I was never successful.

00:27:22

Pasi: Is there a tangible example of where you can see some of this Hegelian
philosophy being worked out, say in a system or in something that the Soviets did
that really didn't make sense to you or U.S. foreign policy makers, or R & D
people in the United States?

00:27:43

Thomas: No, I would be hard pressed. I can point to things where they obviously
thought differently than we do but to ascribe that to Hegelian logic, I couldn't
make that leap. They of course saw the world differently. They saw enormous
threats in the world. They thought that we were bent on the destruction of their
Communist system. Stalin of course was absolutely paranoid about that. I can
point to their view of the submarine operations, their view of anti-satellite
technologies and so forth; as I say, it's different than ours. The strategic defense
initiative that Mr. Reagan undertook starting in 1983 of course was again a kind
of a watershed event in U.S. Soviet relations. And our SDI pursued certain paths
and of course goes on today through our missile defense technologies. The
Soviets had an SDI, though it was completely different than ours and here again it
was difficult to persuade American leaders that they were doing something
different than we were doing.

00:29:40

Pasi: Even earlier than the United States was involved in SDI work, is that right?

8
5 December 2007

Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project

Dr. Richard E. Thomas

00:29:46

Thomas: Yeah, the Soviets of course were very concerned about the SDI work
because a missile defense system would negate their ICBM technology. So all of
their major bragging rights hinged on that ICBM technology and the threat that it
offered to the U.S., and to the west. And so the notion of an SDI, a missile
defense system, that could in fact negate their offensive system was something
that just worried them enormously and that was reflected a lot in the Edinburgh
Conversations which I was involved in in the late eighties.

00:30:39

Pasi: In these conversations-which again your involvement came about because
of your relationship with John Erickson which was due to his working under the
auspices of the Center for Strategic Technology. Is that correct?

00:31:00

Thomas: Well, sort of. John was I think one of the premiere Soviet experts in the
west. He was a brilliant man. He was highly regarded and highly respected by the
Soviets, which was a major point. He did a lot of World War II research in the
Soviet Union and he lectured at Soviet military academies, and as I say he was
highly regarded by the Soviets. Because of his extensive knowledge, the Pentagon
wanted to make use of John's research and understanding of the Soviet Union, so
they wanted to fund his activities. Well the American government can't do that
directly; they would have to launder the money through some other organization.
Well through an odd set of circumstances I invited John to come to Texas A & M
to visit my center. This was in I don't know '79 or '80, something like that. He
had never seen a university like Texas A & M which is of course a very
conservative school, strong military tradition. So he told the government that he
wanted to work with me in my center, which meant that government money was
then channeled through my center to John. So the U.S. government was funding
John, not my center, but we were the enabler; we were the money launderer if you
would for John. The other factor was that John's entourage, the people around
John that worked with him were not engineers and so I guess I was the first of that
ilk that he had substantial involvement with, and there because of that a very close
working relationship evolved between John and me.

00:33:24

Pasi: And was he an engineer, or was he a historian?

00:33:27

Thomas: No. He actually taught in political science or the Department of Politics
at the University of Edinburgh. But as I say his publications dealt with World
War II primarily and the Soviet-German operations. His very first book that got
him international renown-published I think in '62, I believe-was called The
Soviet High Command and through that the Soviet leadership read a Russian
version of John's book and thought very highly of it. As a matter of fact Nikita
Kruschev personally complimented John on the book and invited John to do work
in the Red Army archives which were in the Kremlin. That was in '64 I think
between then and 1990 or a year or so, John was the only westerner that was
allowed in there and so out of that came Road to Stalingrad, Road to Berlin, and
several other books that he wrote that again dealt with the Soviet-German part of
World War IL
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00:34:46

Pasi: Now, the Edinburgh Conversations which came about in the early eighties,
these were established or initiated by him to foster dialogue between the west and
the Soviet Union?

00:35:04

Thomas: Yes. If you recall, we of course embarked on "detente" after the Cuban
Missile Crisis in '62 and that went on for 15 years. The fundamental notion
there-and it was in my view another lesson to be learned I think a horrendous
mistake on the part of the U.S.-the notion was that we would slow our arms
buildup, slow the development of our advanced military technologies and let the
Soviets catch up to us. And the idea was that once that happened then this would
usher in a whole new relationship between the Soviet Union and the US. Well the
Soviets, the Russians, didn't think like that; they saw it as a weakness, detente.
Well by 1975 the guy who was then Secretary of Defense-I'm not sure-under
Carter, I think it was Frank Carlucci, but I'm not sure-went before the Senate
Armed Services Committee encapsulating U.S.-Soviet relations at that point, and
talking about detente he said "when we build they build; when we stop they
build." So it became apparent in the mid-to-late seventies that in fact this new
relationship was not going to evolve out of detente. And then when the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan that of course inspired Mr. Carter to draw the line and
he cancelled U.S. participation in The Olympics, and to his credit actually began
to rearm the U.S. before Mr. Reagan came aboard. I was doing space-based laser
work before Mr. Reagan became president, so there was this notion with that
realization that detente was not doing what we wanted it to, what we thought it
would do. There had been an end in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan;
there was this noticeable chill in U.S.-Soviet relations. So in the '79-'80 time
period east and west were not talking, and so the Ford Foundation starting in, I'm
not sure when it was, '81 or '82, something like that-the Ford Foundation gave
John a grant of money and that was done separately from my center. We were not
involved in that. And the notion was that John would start some informal
strategic discussions with the Soviet Union with the idea being simply to get the
two sides to talk and to exchange ideas. And so that was the nexus of the
Edinburgh Conversations. And the first two conversations that were held were bi
lateral; they were Soviet and British. And it became apparent that if anything was
going to be done there the Americans had to be involved and so indeed we were
then invited to participate. And so at that point the Conversations became tri
lateral discussions. Again, they were not negotiations; these were kind of "no
holds barred" exchanges and they were from my point of view-they were
enormously helpful. And I think when I became involved-again I was the only
engineer that was involved in those discussions and I'm sure the Soviets knew I
was doing classified SDI work at the time because the SDI issue became front and
center when I started to participate in the conversations-but yes that was the
origin of the Conversations and as I say I think they were enormously helpful.

00:39:48

Pasi: At what level was the involvement; you said these were informal talks; were
there any U.S. government officials present from the legislative branch or were
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they all-you said you were one of the few engineers; what types of people were
involved?
00:40:07

Thomas: Well, it varied somewhat. On the U.S. side at different times there were
generally four U.S. representatives. One of the U.S. representatives who
participated extensively was Dr. Lynn Hansen and he was a member of ACDA,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And other occasions there were
people who were sort of on the fringe of the diplomatic community and there
were people, military representatives there, but they sort of floated in and out;
those people did. On the British side the participants there were people from
Sandhurst, the British military academy that participated constantly at every one
of these things and there was-I think--on one occasion there was a former
British ambassador; I'm not sure he was an ambassador to the USSR, but he was
again part of the British diplomatic community. On the Soviet side we had
members, people from the Soviet Ministry of Defense, from the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and of course the ever present KGB folks were there. They
were not of course advertised as such, but they were there none the less, so it was
a kind of a mixture of viewpoints which I think was a good thing to have in the
Conversations given their general character.

00:42:21

Pasi: You said when you eventually began going to the Conversations-to some
of these meetings-the Soviets took an interest in the SDI program. Now I know
that also played a pretty important role in some of the summits that had been
ongoing at the time between Reagan and Gorbachev in that period. I know that
played into the Reykjavik Summit, I'm not sure it played into the Geneva Summit
as well.

00:42:45

Thomas: Yes, that was the quintessential technological meeting, Reykjavik

00:42:48

Pasi: Why, ifthe Soviets also had an SDI program, why were they so concerned
about our program that became known at the time as "Star Wars?" Why were they
so hung up on that particular technology?

00:43:15

Thomas: Well Gino, just as we had difficulty reading Soviet signs and
technology, and understanding the character of that, they had problems reading us
and this was odd because in the post Cold War era there have been books written
by Soviet authors, Russian authors--one in particular by a gentleman by the name
ofMitrokhin and he was deputy director of the KGB, and wrote a couple of
fascinating books about the Soviet acquisition of U.S. technology. And I must say
that in the wake of that and in the wake of Venona, and other recent revelations,
the Soviets had penetrated a lot of our stuff. I don't know that we had any real
secrets. But despite the information that they had, they seemed to overrate us.
This came home to me in one of the very first Conversations when I had an
exchange about the SDI. The Soviets saw that as a center for developing "space
strike weapons" and in an early exchange with them it became apparent to me that
they were crediting us-I mean what they failed to realize, Gino, and many
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people fail to realize, when Mr. Reagan announced the SDI in March of 1983 he
described it as exactly what it was, a "research program." We were going to study
whether or not it was possible to intercept an ICBM warhead, and that's what it
was. Well there were people in the American press as you say, dubbed it "Star
Wars," assumed that because it was highly classified we already had these
weapons. The Soviets seemed to fall into that trap too and as I say they credited
us with capabilities that we didn't have at the time, and so I think that was at the
root of why Gorbachev and the other Soviet leadership was so concerned about
the SDI.
00:46:01

Pasi: What capability did they think we had some kind oflaser capabilities in
outer space to wipe out buildings and pinpoint targets, that sort of thing?

00:46:12

Thomas: Yes. In the early phases of the SDI, Edward Teller for example authored
a paper about a nuclear driven x-ray laser, space-based. Well that was very far out
and never was really a viable concept. What evolved of course was other
technologies that were more workable; one was called "Brilliant Pebbles." this
was, well if you want to knock out an ICBM, if you have superb guidance to hit it
with some kinetic energy system, just a mass of something to hit it, you don't
need to have an explosion. And of course we had some pretty good guidance
technologies at that point and so that part of technology was called a "Smart
Rock." Well if we miniaturized that and made it even smarter, that led to what we
called "Brilliant Pebbles" and that was a very workable system and it's part of our
missile defense system that we're using today. But the Soviets couldn't get over
the notion that the SDI involved this space based laser thing and as I say we got
into a discussion in one of the conversations about that where they saw this as an
ability to-not to intercept an ICBM warhead out in space-but to actually attack
something on the ground. And that just absolutely amazed me, except for the fact
that at that point they had a rail-mobile SS-25; this was an ICBM that was based
on a railroad car and they would run it around at night and then they would run it
underneath a soft cover like a huge tent to shield it from observation by our space
based satellites. And they credited us with an ability to find and attack with an
imaginary space based laser those rail-mobile SS-25s. So they saw the SDI as
being a lot more than it was and that of course led to the Reykjavik Summit where
Gorbachev was, where his advisors told him that the SDI had to be stopped in
some way and so that was the nature of his pitch at Reykjavik.

00:49:37

Pasi: Which didn't work ultimately.

00:49:38

Thomas: Happily did not work. Mr. Reagan said "no."

00:49:43

Pasi: And so the idea, I guess, and I'm just conjecturing here-that they must
have thought that if you control space then you control the world.

00:49:52

Thomas: Yes, it's the ultimate high ground
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00:49:55

Pasi: Dr. Thomas, This might be a good time to take a short break and we'll pick
it up again in a few minutes

00:50:02

Thomas: Mighty fine, thank you.

End of video tape 1
Start of video tape 2

00:00:00

Pasi: Once again today is Wednesday, December 5, 2007 we are talking this
morning with Dr. Richard Thomas. Dr. Thomas you've talked about your career
with the Center for Strategic Technology at Texas A&M; we've talked about
some of the projects you were involved in there. Would you mind telling us a
little bit about how the Center came about and what things went into effect to
develop this center, and how you became its first director?

00:00:41

Thomas: Well, I had become Associate Dean of Engineering at Texas A&M in
the early seventies and then subsequently was acting Dean for 3 years. So
because of those positions I was concerned about the College of Engineering and
its role in Texas A&M as a whole-a little bit broader view than a normal
professorial kind of perspective and-excuse me, let me back up a bit. I
originally went to Texas A&M after I got my Ph.D. at Ohio State in the early
sixties and then subsequently became head of the Department of Aerospace
Engineering at the University of Maryland which is located of course right outside
of Washington. During those years at Maryland I had a front row seat of course
for what was going on in the federal government and one of the things that
disturbed me was that any time that a congressional committee needed some
advice on an engineering matter, inevitably they would get some guy from MIT or
Stanford. And they're bright people of course, but it's not the end of the
engineering intellectual world when you go beyond MIT and Stanford. Well that
kind of rankled me and so through an odd set of circumstances I left the
University of Maryland and went back to Texas A&M, and that was when I
ultimately became Associate Dean and then acting Dean and I worked for a fine
man, Fred Benson, who was a very perceptive man, again a guy who was able to
relate what he saw going on at Tex as A&M to the larger world, and so he and I
would commiserate about issues of this type.
On one occasion I wrote him a memo and I remember the first line; I said Dean
"I'm concerned about Texas A&M's image as a football-military oriented cow
college." That's a direct quote. And I told him I thought that to some extent the
image was deserved, but to some extent it was not deserved because we had great
people too. On the other hand, I thought we needed more bright people and I said
to him why don't we start what we then called simply a "special research center"
composed of people that were highly regarded? Back in those days there was a
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television commercial for E.F. Hutton the financial firm and one of the tag lines
was "when E.F. Hutton talks, people listen." Well that's what I told my friend; I
said "what we need are people who when they talk, other folks listen, so why
don't we set up a special research center who's aim is to simply insert Texas
A&M more into s~me of the national and international dialogue dealing with
engineering matters." He thought it was a heck of a good idea. He took the idea
to the then President or Chancellor and it got derailed briefly, but after a few years
it came back. And by this time I had decided that engineering administration was
not my bag, so I was going to go back to teaching and research. And so he said
"Dick, there's only one guy to lead this new center and that's you."
And so we debated at length about the name. And as a matter of fact I was in
Cairo at the American University in Cairo and we had a series of telex exchanges.
I mean he had to go before the Board of Regents to present this idea and so we
bandied it about. And there was an element within the Pentagon called "strategic
technology" and so I said to him "why don't we simply call it"-well it's not
simple of course; the name is too long really but to really define what we were
about-I said "why don't we call it the Center for Strategic Technology" and
that's what it was. So its original mission was comparatively broad. Subsequently
we were visited by General Jim Smith who was a two-star general who was an
A&M graduate, but he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Pentagon.
And so he came. When the center was set up it was described as a think-tank and
as a matt~r of fact there was an editorial and op-ed writer from the Dallas
Morning News who was very enthused about this new center and thought it was
just going to be super good. But General Smith came to us and said-and he
knew of my involvement in intelligence matters-and he said "Dick, is your
center going to do Soviet studies?" I said "oh, we might do some," but I said
"don't you have enough university centers doing Soviet studies?"
He said "my friend none of them are based in science and engineering and you're
an engineer." He said "you'll lead it in a different direction." He said, "beyond
that, the existing Soviet study centers all listen to the same briefings in
Washington; they all get the same information; they all end up chasing their tails
and we don't get any new ideas." He said "we need new ideas with regard to our
relationship with the Soviet Union." He was obviously right; I thought he was
right, being of course a card-carrying engineer. And so we became the only-I
believe-the only U.S. university doing Soviet studies, but in fact was headed by
an engineer and that focused on science and technology.
Then of course when we had our sort of accidental affiliation with John Erickson,
we had no proven track record in this arena. Suddenly when we became affiliated
with John Erickson we were thrust into the upper echelons of strategic studies and
that was a major coup for us for a variety ofreasons, not least funding of course.
And so that was the background for the center. Because of some decisions made
by some of the subsequent engineering leaders, our broader mission of trying to
insert Texas A&M more into some of the policy decision making processes, that
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got downplayed and we did not achieve that part of our mission. On the other
hand the Soviet studies became sort of the major thing for which the Center was
known and of course it ran then up to '91 or so when the Soviet Union failed. At
that point of course there was nobody interested in doing Soviet studies and our
funding went away. And so subsequently the center was closed at that point. So
that's the brief history.
00:09:51

Pasi: Did the funding dry up pretty much immediately after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union?

00:09:56

Thomas: Yes, very quickly. I made a tour around, I think it was '91. And I went
to all the folks-I mean we had had funding from CIA from DIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, from Air Force entities other than NASIC or FTD at that
point. We had a variety of sources of funding and I went to each one of them and
said "ok, the Soviet Union is no more; what does the future look like?" It looked
pretty bleak. And of course our main mission at the center was the education for
young people. I mean, that should not be forgotten, that was our main goal, to
produce young folks. And we had of course a large cadre of students,
undergraduates and graduates, that really were the main muscle of the Center, and
when it became apparent, Gino that I couldn't support my students, that is to say
when you offer a young man who's starting to work on his master's degree, you
want to make sure if you're going to offer him assistantship that you're going to
have money to see him through two years of study and of course longer for a
Ph.D. Well with the way funding became at that point-very uncertain-I could
not see the center fulfilling that requirement, fulfilling that obligation to the
students. And that more than anything led to the closure of the Center. I would
have to say that the engineering administration at that point-this again was '91
at Texas A&M. The Deputy Director of the Engineering Station said "Dick, if
you want to scale back the Center and keep it going we'll try to fund you as best
we can." That was fine but the kind of money he had was not what we needed
really to do the job; we were soft-money funded. I never got more than sixty or
seventy thousand dollars from the university; my center in its heyday was pulling
in close to $1,000,000 in funded research and so when the cutback came, it was
quite dramatic and led to the folding of the Center.

00:12:53

Pasi: Now in the, I guess twelve or thirteen years that the Center was in operation,
where would the ideas for research come from, always from the outside? Would
they generate from the inside and then you would seek funding to continue this
research? Could you explain how that process of ideas would work and function?

00: 13 :16

Thomas: Yes, it happened both ways. As our expertise evolved, again with John
Erickson's help, the intelligence community began to realize that we did have
something unique to offer. And so yes, on occasions we were sought out by
people who wanted us to study something like that. On other occasions we
generated things because of my aerospace background as you might imagine and
because of the discussions in the Edinburgh Conversations and other things. The
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Soviet aerospace technology, and in particular the space technology, was a major
concern for us and one of the things that Erickson pointed out to one of the odd
characteristics of the Soviet military organization was their reliance on what they
called "military districts." And in fact the Soviets had the entire globe divided up
into military districts and a military district is an area where you study the
prospects for combat in that arena. Of course the military districts that fronted on
Western Europe were very active and of course there were maneuvers and
constant upgrades of weapons and so forth, while the African theatre of military
concern was much more passive, but none the less they did that.
One of my colleagues Dr. Jake Kipp a very renowned Sovietologist, again
historian, not an engineer, saw things in the Soviet literature which indicated that
the Soviets were considering a space theatre of military operations. We broached
that idea and of course, as you might suspect, it drew a lot of interest. And so that
was something that was generated from within my center that drew eventually a
lot of interest and a lot of support. On the other side, the CIA and the DIA in the
late eighties got into a fight-difference of opinion-about how rapidly the
Soviets would be able to develop their own gas fields in western Siberia. And the
CIA thought they could do it pretty quickly; the DIA thought that Soviet
technology was not really up to that and that its evolution would come much more
slowly. So I was called; I was contacted by a fellow from DIA, asked to come by
his office and said they wanted us to referee this fight, basically to do a separate
study that would determine whether it was going to be a fast operation or a slow
operation. So in that case of course that idea came from outside and turned out to
be an area where we did some significant work.
00:17:13

Pasi: What was your relationship like with these other intelligence organizations
like the CIA? Was there ever a moment where they might have said "oh we didn't
know that," where they might have been jealous, or was it pretty amicable and
they regarded you simply as a useful research organization?

00:17:36

Thomas: Oh, no they were very cordial and they had the proper view, namely that
we had some intellectual horsepower that they didn't have. And with the likes of
John Erickson, we had perspectives that they didn't have and so no, they saw us
as an asset and utilized us. So there was no competition in that regard. I spoke of
the intelligence agencies and the fruits of our labors were disseminated in other
ways Gino that were important. For example, when I would go to one of the
Edinburgh Conversations, whether it was in Edinburgh or in Moscow, when I
came back to the United States I was debriefed both at the DIA and the CIA. And
a bunch oftheir analysts would gather in a secure room, I would give a brief
overview of whatever the conversations were at the time, the discussions that
occurred [and] then they would ask questions of me. Well on one of those
occasions a gentleman came to the CIA debriefing whose name was Ty Cobb, not
the famous baseball player of course, but this was Dr. Tyrus Cobb who was a
Ph.D. in Russian history. As a matter of fact he was a retired Army colonel who
had taught Russian history at West Point, but in the eighties he worked for Mr.
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Reagan in the National Security apparatus and was part of a team that prepared
Mr. Reagan's morning security briefing. Every morning he got a briefing and Dr.
Cobb was part of that.
Of course on this occasion at the CIA briefing there was a lot of discussion about
the SDI and he knew of course that Mr. Reagan was very concerned about the
Soviet reaction to the SDI and what they thought of it, and there was a lot of
dispute about that. Again in part engendered because so many of our media types
have no technological background, don't understand science and engineering, and
so they were misreading the SDI almost as badly as the Soviets were. Well after
my briefing, Ty came up and gave me his card, and asked me to stop by his office
which was in the Executive Office Building next to the White House. So out of
that came a working relationship and some of the fruits of our research, and some
of the stuff that came out of the Edinburgh Conversations were fed by Dr. Cobb
into Mr. Reagan's security briefings. This turned out to be some sort of a factor. I
can't judge how important it was, at the Reykjavik summit meeting between
Gorbachev and Reagan which was principally SDI focused. And my pitch to Dr.
Cobb and through him to Mr. Reagan was that the Soviets were scared to death of
the SDI. They didn't see it as a research program; they thought it was something
that we already had. I've said they gave us more credit for those technologies then
we actually deserved so they were overrating us and I think this message about
their fear, and their deep concerns was conveyed to Mr. Reagan. And I would
like to think that was one of the things that anchored his view at Reykjavik. But
whether it was, or not, I don't know. But the point I'm making is that there were
a variety of ways that our research results, and the understanding of the Soviet
Union that we evolved, fed into the Intel community and other elements, other
agencies.
00:22:35

Pasi: As you said previously FTD, which at the time I believe was still the
Foreign Technology Division which is now NASIC at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, would funnel projects through the Center for Strategic Technology. What
types of projects would they have you work on? I think I remember an SDI
project that they were involved in is that correct?

00:23:05

Thomas: No, they didn't do any SDI related stuff. That came from other sources.
The FTD had us do a variety of studies. Some of them drew on John's expertise.
And they would give me issues to raise with John about the Soviet Union, and
these dealt with Soviet military doctrine. John was of the view that if you wanted
to understand what the Soviets were going to do in the future, what you needed to
do was to study Soviet military doctrine and a lot of that was published openly.
There were classified versions of it, but they published a lot of the stuff in Soviet
military journals that were open and unclassified. So we studied that and out of
that came some very worthwhile information that fit in to FTD. It took a while
for FTD and for Air Force intelligence to really believe that something
unclassified could be useful. I think that was another contribution that we made.
The Air Force, this was another entity, not FTD, but it was a west coast Air Force
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asked me to do a study of Soviet long-wave infrared technologies and this was a
totally open study. We looked at Soviet scientific publications and looked at the
research they were doing in long-wave infrared sensor systems, and that proved to
be kind of a landmark study. The FTD's interest-for example on one occasion
they had us do a study ofjet engine technology around the world and this was
looking at not only the Soviet turbine engine capabilities which again were based
largely on some engines they bought from the Brits in 1948, but the Swedes had
developed some separate turbine engine technologies; the French and the Brits
had done that-and so they had us do a kind of a worldwide survey ofjet-engine
technology and make some assessment as to what the current status was; what the
trends were and what was going to be five years hence in terms of thrust, fuel
consumption, that kind of thing. And so we did a variety of things for FTD.
00:26:35

Pasi: In all this research did you ever feel that the Soviets had an advantage over
us in any way, in the research that you did or in what you saw that others were
doing? Was there ever this notion that they were ahead of us whether in numbers
or the possibility to create useful, superior systems?

00:27:06

Thomas: I think the area Gino that I was most impressed with them, in terms of
their capability, was in remote control. They had and continue to have an
enormous capability in handling aircraft and spacecraft, and missiles and robotic
vehicles of all kinds. I met the young man, incidentally, in the Soviet Union in the
wake of the Chernobyl disaster where they had a nuclear power plant that
exploded-he developed a family of robotic vehicles, remotely controlled
obviously, with which they could go into a high radiation zone and make repairs
to something, or do whatever needed to be done in that area. So in the area of
remote control I would say they were equal to or better than we were, but that was
about it. In their long-wave infrared sensor research for example, the defining
parameter there is something called D* which is the specific detectivity; keep in
mind that a long wave infrared sensor has a light wave that comes in and hits the
piece of material, and knocks off an ion. That's called photo-ionization and that's
the way these long wave infrared sensors work.
Well in their research that they published they never gave any information on D*
because that would tip us off of course as to where they were in terms of their
capabilities. However they did give data electron mobility. An electron mobility is
not die specific equivalent to D*, but it relates io D*. And so we were able, using
electron mobility figures published in their research, to compare their electron
mobilities to ours. We found them to be in pretty much the same arena. So in that
area they were equivalent to us in terms of their sensor research, but again Gino
we come back to the design and manufacturing issue. And where they seem to fall
down was in manufacturing sensors based on or making use of these long wave
infrared devices that came out of their laboratories. They had big difficulty with
noise which is·related to impurities. They tried for example to grow some of these
sensors on their Salyut space station; they failed. So to get back to your question,
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I don't know that I saw anything where they were superior to us. There were some
areas where they were equivalent to us.
00:30:41

Pasi: And because you went back to that notion of manufacturing again, I know in
your reprinted conversations with Erickson both of you talked about an inherent
flaw in Soviet command and control, and I was wondering if you could describe
what exactly command and control is and what that flaw was?

00:31:06

Thomas: Well, you can define it narrowly or broadly. The broad definition
involves command and control and the integration of intelligence information,
and fundamentally it relates the way you conduct your wars. It deals with the way
the high command gets information, makes an assessment about what is
happening on the battlefield and relays information, and directives to the combat
forces. Beyond that it has some strategic consequences or factors and in 1982,
Marshal Ogarkov who was then Chief of Staff of the Soviet military wrote a paper
called "Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland" and it was published openly in
the Soviet military high command journal. It was actually a small book of about
28 pages and it has all the usual communist blather, that all the problems in the
world are caused by the United States, but "don't worry, comrade your
communist party leaders are on top of things and we're watching things," and so
forth. But buried within that was the notion of what he called-and he was the
first one to use these terms which are used a lot today-"a revolution in military
affairs."
Command and control was central to what he saw there because he saw the
evolution of a lot of new sensor systems, new communications systems and new
weapons based on what he called new physical principles which were weapons
systems that were precision guided like our SDI "Brilliant Pebbles" kinds of
things. Of course "Brilliant Pebbles" had not emerged yet in 1982, but this was a
clarion call by the Chief of the Soviet military for the Soviet military high
command itself and its allies in the Soviet science, and engineering community to
get high behind, and develop some of these new technologies that he foresaw.
Basically what he said was this revolution in military affairs involved a sea
change in the nature of future war and as it stood, the Soviet Union was not
prepared to fight on that battlefield and it had better get high behind if in fact they
expected to do that. As I say it was a major event and the Soviet Union was not
able to respond; they simply couldn't do it.
And that is another reason why they were so petrified by the SDI, because they
saw us succeeding in one element in this changed nature of future war. It affected
their view of command and control; it affected their view of weaponry. For
example one of the things that Ogarkov said was if you have a conventionally
armed weapon, something with simply TNT on board, if you can guide it very
carefully, very accurately into a target, you don't need a nuclear weapon. To
simplify, suppose that you need to knock down a smokestack over here of a
defense plant, well you can do it two ways; you can detonate a nuclear weapon
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two miles away and the shockwave will knock the stack over, or if you've got
precision guided weapons, you can send it into the base of that stack. And we
could do that. We are able to do that now; you can knock the stack over. That was
Ogarkov's view. He saw it as not only a command and control issue but a military
technology issue that really transcended what they had seen in the past as the
nature of future war, because he saw that nature changing remarkably.
00:36:30

Pasi: I wonder if their experience in Afghanistan may have fed that desire to shift
at all.

00:36:36

Thomas: Yes. The salient point there was Mr. Reagan approved the transfer of our
Stinger Missiles, our shoulder fired heat seeking missiles, to the Afghani so-called
"freedom fighters." Once they got their hands on that and we got them trained on
how to use them, they started knocking Soviet helicopters out of the sky with
alarming regularity. And if one had to point to one factor that was a key factor in
the Soviets decision to pull out of Afghanistan it was that Stinger missile issue
and it was a thing that affected Ogarkov's thinking very greatly.

00:37:32

Pasi: It seems that what Ogarkov wrote about would be echoed in our experience
at least in the first Persian Gulf War with precision guided weapons. That
would've been an exact model of what he was trying to put forth.

00:37:52

Thomas: Yes.

00:37:57

Pasi: Going back to Erickson and we mentioned this briefly a little bit before. He
was adamant that we had erred; the west had erred in not thinking Soviet, or
specifically the U.S. had erred in not thinking Soviet. Is that fair to ...

00:38:19

Thomas: I'm sorry, say it again

00 :38:24

Pasi: Erickson was adamant in his belief that we had failed at least in foreign
policy or in R&D because we had not been thinking Soviet, is that correct?

00:38:33

Thomas: Yes. He saw a lot of mirror imaging. This tendency to believe that the
Soviets thought like we did, and were going to act like we did and would respond
to stimuli like we did, so called "rational actors concept." Detente was proof that
that was not the case and John spoke of this. He talked to a lot of people, to a lot
of groups in Washington. Every time he came to the US to come to my center for
example he would always stop in Washington and give talks to DIA and CIA
people, and he would echo this "think Soviet" kind of thing extensively and echo
the value of studying Soviet open literature, studying Soviet military doctrine if
you want to understand where they're going in the future and so forth. So yes, this
was a recurring theme and he said that to the Brits too. The Brits were not all that
much better than we were in terms of analyzing the Soviets. So yes, he wore this
theme out extensively. And as I've said, especially after the failure of detente,
people began to listen to him and heed his words, but it was a long time coming.
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00:40:20

Pasi: He didn't seem to have high hopes for any of the SALT or SALT II or even
the START, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties that were ongoing at the time
because his idea was again echoing Carter's Defense Secretary that "when we
stop, they build." They only want limitation so that they have time to catch up to
us.

00:40:47

Thomas: Right.

00:40:51

Pasi: What did we do right, then, in your estimation, Dick? If we won the Cold
War and we erred for so long in not thinking Soviet, in deluding ourselves into
this sort of "mirror imaging" where they'll do what we do, we obviously did
something right. What do you think were some of the things we did right?

00:41 :17

Thomas: The main thing was the SDI. This was something Gino that we
should've been doing all along. This is why I say we could've started in 1962 at
the start of detente. We could've started then challenging them technologically,
but instead we cut back. We cancelled the neutron bomb, we cancelled our cruise
missile development or stretched it out, and we cancelled the original B-1
bomber. We cancelled that as part of detente.

00:41:53

Pasi: Was this in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis?

00:41:56

Thomas: Yes, right. Again I have to give credit to Jimmy Carter because in the
late 70s, in the late phases of his presidency, again in the wake of their going into
Afghanistan, he began to see the need for the U.S. to rearm and to rearm with the
very latest, most high tech stuff we could get. So we resurrected the B-1 bomber
and so forth, and our cruise missile developments and then when Mr. Reagan
came aboard in 1983 announcing the SDI, that was a technological challenge to
the Soviets. So that was the main thing we did right in winning the Cold War.
And there are revisionist historians who say Russia would've folded anyway.
Well, perhaps, but it's just not axiomatic that that would've occurred. The
technological pressure that we put on them caused Gorbachev to say to his wife
Raisa on one occasion "we cannot go on as we are." So he recognized that
something had to change and he tried to change it. He instituted a new program
centered around, what were called, MNTKs, Inter-Branch Scientific and
Technical Centers. And they were an effort on his part to bridge some of these
problems in the research-technology developmenhdesign manufacturing nexus,
but it failed miserably.
It's hard for me to point to other successes. Well, now wait a minute. There was
in the Helsinki Accords, a human rights focus to one element of those accords and
of course the Soviets had trampled on human rights from East Germany to
Vladivostok. This was an important issue because there is some evidence to
support the notion that as deteiite became what the Soviets thought would be the
general pattern for US Soviet relations-where we would constrain our weapons
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development and so forth-there is a view that they thought that they could
surmount the United States through the Third World and they used Castro as a
surrogate to mount Communist revolutions in Central and South America. There
were other areas, Southeast Asia and so forth where they supported efforts to
surmount us in the Third World, and we began to realize subsequently that that
was part of their new strategy. And so we took some efforts to confront them in
that arena. That was one of the things we did right and again to harp on this
human rights issue extensively because it was patently obvious that communist
totalitarianism was the same whether it was Russia whether it was Cuba whatever.
So this was a major advance for us.
00:46:42

Pasi: Dr. Thomas, for future researchers who probably won't know this-this is a
kind of a shift now-you were instrumental in and an early initiator of the project
for which you're now sitting for an interview, the Cold War Aerospace
Technology History Project. Maybe in the last few minutes remaining in the
interview, could you discuss a little bit about this project came about and why you
sought to bring it about, and what the importance of it is

00:47:26

Thomas: [the interviewee misunderstood or misheard the question] The project
was called "Perestroika Watch" and it emerged in the mid-to-late eighties and this
again was in part a result of our focus on Soviet science and engineering, and
technology, and so forth, and coupled with a realization that we had to "think
Soviet," a realization that in fact open literature could be mined usefully, that
there was worthwhile information there. There was a host of things that came
together that caused us to conclude that in fact this kind of framework was really
what we needed to study foreign technologies in the future. And one of the main
gentlemen who joined us in this was from FTD, Steve Williams by name and he's
now retired. Steve funded us to pursue this. So basically it was an effort to try to
expand the ways that we did, in this case, Soviet studies, but on a broader basis,
foreign technological studies. Again it had a "think Soviet" focus, or today of
course a "think Chinese" focus, or a "think Arab" focus when it comes to the War
on Terror, to try to understand what motivates them to do what they're doing.
How do they see science and technology in their system? How do they make use
of it? What military doctrine drives them and again what military doctrine defines
how they use advanced technologies, or don't use in the case of the Arabs in this
situation.
So this was the defining feature of Perestroika Watch, to think broadly, to try to
understand everything you can about your enemy, to try to understand those non
technical factors as policy matters that drive their use of science and technology.
And in pursuit of trying to understand everything you can. That of course means
study their open literature extensively. Study everything that they write and try to
understand, who the movers and shakers are in their system. Who shapes their
views? So that was the essence of Perestroika Watch. When we mounted this
campaign as Mr. Williams said, "Dick we have to go about this very carefully
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because we cannot go to the U.S. intelligence community and say "guys you've
been doing it all wrong."
So what we elected to do was kind of a soft sell approach. First of all we set up a
group of guys who were analysts like we were and were like minded who agreed
with this approach, and so we started turning out newsletters-like one a month
and sending it to fifty or sixty of the important upper level defense analysts
around the community, with the view of gradually leading them into this new
promised land of technology assessment and studies. And that was another thing
that ended when the Soviet Union folded. That was the end of Perestroika Watch.
But it's still an issue that needs to be pursued. We still need to learn how to do
that, how to implement that kind of approach. There is evidence that we don't
understand the Arab mind. I think there's evidence that we don't understand the
Chinese mind. And so, sad to say, there is still much to be learned in how you
evaluate military technologies and strategic technologies.
00:52:31

Pasi: Do you think this desire to understand the Chinese mind, the Arabic mind,
led to your desire to create an archive here at Wright State University about Cold
War technology?

00:52:49

Thomas: Absolutely. In my first discussions with Dr. Foster, I said to him, "I do
hope that the historian of the future, some chap twenty years from now who
suddenly rediscovers the Cold War would come to Wright State and view a
technology based archive, because in my view, and of course I take the
engineering point of view, the Cold War was largely a technological conflict." So
yes, I think there are enormously important lessons to be learned from studying
that conflict and I think that Wright State is front and center with this archive.
And of course the link to Wright-Patterson is a natural thing because there were
so many of the new technologies that played an important role, like stealth
technology for example in the Cold War, that had their roots in the activities here
in Wright Patterson. So it's a natural linkage. But of course Cold War technology
extends beyond Wright Patterson. And don't forget NASIC here, the National Air
and Space Intelligence Center, again the center for studying foreign technologies,
that too needs to be a part of the archive and part of the local system for doing
these advanced studies in foreign military technologies. So yes, I think that
Wright State has a front and center position to play in this endeavor.

00:54:43

Pasi: Dr. Thomas, before we close I'd like to give you the opportunity to talk
about anything that you feel we may have glossed over today that you would like
to discuss, if there is anything.

00:55 :09

Thomas: Well, the thing that has been glossed over, and this is a very critical
issue- I talked about my sort of back channel communications with Mr. Reagan
through Ty Cobb. It's fine to have an improved understanding of foreign military
doctrine, foreign military uses of science and technology, but Gino, you have to
take that knowledge and put it in the minds of our leaders, our congressmen, our
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administrators, and that I regret to say is virgin territory. We have a culture that
in my view is driven by science and technology, but I would submit to you that
there are lots of people on Capitol Hill-and I'm not suggesting a technocracy, a
system run by engineers, God help us no-but we have to find ways to take this
information that we develop and put it in the minds of our leaders so that they can
crank that into their decision making process, and we haven't done very well in
that regard. And so that's an area where behaviorists and other non-tech people
can get an oar in the stream. But again they can come back and look at the
information that's in the Cold War archive here at Wright State, and they can
study how that stuff was developed, but did not really impact until very late our
relationship with the Soviet Union. So there are lots of lessons to be learned; there
is still a lot of work to be done in this whole arena of technology and society,
technology and culture, technology and politics. I wish I could be confident that
we're addressing that issue. I fear that we are not and I leave it to young people
like you, and those who follow along to address that issue.
00:57:49

Pasi: Well on that note, Dick thank you for being with us this morning and thank
you for initiating this entire project for us, and getting it off the ground for us.

00:58:02

Thomas: Thank you. Obviously it is a labor of love; it is something that I think is
extremely important and again I thank you for inviting me to come share these
thoughts with you. Thank you all.

00:58:13

Pasi: Our pleasure.
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